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Palazzolo v. Rhode Island: Preserving a
Constitutional Safety Valve in the Murky
Waters of the Self-Imposed Hardship Rule
Samuel Taylor Hirzel 11*
I.

Introduction

A basic purpose of a zoning variance is to prevent the application of
zoning regulations to a particular parcel of private property from
2
resulting in the taking of property' in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
The variance acts as a constitutional "safety valve" to preserve the
validity of the zoning laws. 3 In Pennsylvania, this safety valve may be
closed in circumstances in which a landowner had notice of the zoning
regulations at the time of transfer of title. However, because recent
United States Supreme Court precedent provides that a taking may occur
even when the landowner had such notice, the safety valve must remain
open to prevent the invalidation of many applications of Pennsylvania
zoning laws.
In Pennsylvania, two types of variances are available: the
traditional 4 variance and the validity variance. A party seeking a
traditional zoning variance must show an unnecessary hardship. 5 An

* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University, 2003; B.A., Columbia College, Columbia University, 2000.
1. See, e.g., JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE
PLANNING AND CONTROL § 5.14 (1st ed. 1998).

2.

The Fifth Amendment provides in part, "nor shall private property be taken for

public use without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment is
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV. The purpose of the Takings Clause is to prevent the government from "forcing
some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice should be
borne by the public as a whole." Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 616 (2001)
(citing Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
3. See id
4. The qualifier "traditional" is used to distinguish this variance from a validity
variance. For more background on the different variances, see infra Part 11.
5. See In re Gro, 269 A.2d 876, 878 (Pa. 1970).
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unnecessary hardship cannot be self-imposed.6 Self-imposed hardships
can arise through actual or constructive notice of preexisting zoning
regulations upon acquisition combined with either a violation of the
regulations or too much or too little consideration on the purchase of the
property.7 This combination prevents a property owner from obtaining a
traditional variance under the self-imposed hardship rule in
Pennsylvania. Although the strict application of the self-imposed
hardship rule has been in decline in most jurisdictions
for a number of
8
Pennsylvania.
in
remain
doctrine
the
of
vestiges
years,
The validity variance, the second type of variance, applies when the
zoning ordinance is valid in general but confiscatory as applied. 9 Here,
the variance is issued not because the traditional requirements for a
variance are met, but because the government may not impose zoning
regulations that deny all reasonable use of the land. l°
Prior to June 2001, it was not clear whether a taking could occur on
the basis of facts that bar the traditional variance. t" In Palazzolo v.
Rhode Island,1 2 the United States Supreme Court reversed Rhode
Island's threshold bar to a landowner's takings claim when the
landowner acquired title to the property subject to the regulations ("the
notice rule") that allegedly created the taking.1 3 The Court's rejection of
the notice rule and suggestion that regulations do not become part of the
6. See id. at 879.
7. See, e.g., Marple Gardens, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 303 A.2d 239, 241
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973) (finding that financial hardship of using the property profitably
as zoned, because of difficulties in the topography, after purchase with knowledge of the
regulations is not grounds for variance); see also Gro, 269 A.2d at 880-81 (finding that
consideration on purchase was too much to justify use as zoned but is not grounds for a
variance); Best v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 141 A.2d 606, 608 (Pa. 1958) (finding that
financial hardship of maintaining property as zoned after purchase subject to the
complained of regulations is not grounds for variance); ROBERT S. RYAN, PENNSYLVANIA
LAND USE & PRACTICE § 6.2.13 (1998).
Of course self-imposed hardships may also arise by the actions of the landowner that
create the hardship (or a predecessor in title), rather than the hardship impact of the
regulations on the property. In this situation, it is not the notice rule that bars the
variance and Palazzolo does not affect the analysis.
8. See Roeser Prof I Builder, Inc. v. Anne Arundel County, 793 A.2d 545 (Md.
2002). Even if the application of the rule is not as strict as it once was in Pennsylvania,
vestiges of the rule remain. See, e.g., In re Gregor, 627 A.2d 308, 312 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1993) ("The right to develop a nonconforming lot is not personal to the owner of the
property at the time of enactment of the zoning ordinance but runs with the land, and a
purchaser's knowledge of zoning restrictions alone is insufficient to preclude the grant of
the variance unless the purchase itself gives rise to the hardship."); see also supra note 7.
9. See Pierce v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 189 A.2d 138, 141 (Pa. 1963); see also
RYAN, supra note 7, § 6.1.7.
10. See Pierce, 189 A.2d at 141; Ferry v. Kownacki, 152 A.2d 456 (Pa. 1959).
11. See Pierce, 189 A.2d at 141; see also RYAN, supra note 7, § 6.1.8.
12. 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
13. See id.
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title to the property upon transfer requires that Pennsylvania courts apply
validity variance analysis when the self-imposed hardship rule is invoked
to bar a traditional variance.
A traditional variance cannot act as a constitutional safety valve
when the self-imposed hardship rule is applied. Because the selfimposed hardship rule precludes the award of a traditional variance when
the landowner had notice of the regulations at the time of acquisition, the
rule prevents the traditional variance from alleviating situations in which
a regulatory taking may otherwise occur. Therefore, validity variance
analysis must be applied if Pennsylvania is to preserve the
constitutionality of its zoning regulations when the self-imposed hardship
rule is invoked to prevent a traditional variance.
In Palazzolo, the Supreme Court remanded the case14 to the state
trial court for consideration of the merits of the takings claim under the
ad hoc factor analysis of Penn Central TransportationCo. v. New York
City. 15 This ad hoc test looks primarily, but not exclusively, to three

significant factors: the economic impact on the claimant, the extent to
which the regulation interferes with investment backed expectations, and
the character or extent of the government action. 16 The Palazzolo
majority opinion did not address how to analyze post-regulation
acquisition under investment-backed expectations.
The concurrences of Justices O'Connor and Scalia sharply
disagreed on how post-regulation acquisition was to be analyzed under
the investment-backed expectations factor on remand.17
This
unanswered question may determine whether post-regulation acquisition
can play any role in Penn Central takings analysis, and thus whether
such factors may even be considered in analyzing whether a validity
variance is necessary after application of the self-imposed hardship rule.
This comment analyzes the application of Pennsylvania's selfimposed hardship rule after Palazzolo. Part II provides background on
the application of the self-imposed hardship rule and validity variances.
Part III reviews Palazzolo, focusing on the rejection of the notice rule as
a bar to takings claims, and the rejection of the notion that regulations
may inhere in the title to property upon transfer. Part IV analyzes the
utility of Pennsylvania's self-imposed hardship rule in light of Palazzolo,
and under the concurring Justices' divergent views of how notice of
regulations shapes investment-backed expectations. Finally, Part V
concludes that the self-imposed hardship rule may no longer provide the
14.

See id. at 632.

15.

438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).

16. See id.
17. Compare Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 632-36 (O'Connor, J., concurring), with id. at
636-37 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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final determination of whether a variance is necessary to preserve the
constitutionality of a zoning ordinance.
II.

Background on Pennsylvania's Self-Imposed Hardship Rule

In Pennsylvania, a party seeking a traditional zoning variance must
show: (1) an unnecessary hardship that is unique or peculiar to the
property exists, and (2) the proposed variance is not contrary to the
public interest. 18 A hardship that is self-imposed cannot form the basis
for an unnecessary hardship. 19 These self-imposed hardships arise in two
main ways.
One type of self-imposed hardship is created when the property
owner's actions put the land in violation of a particular zoning ordinance.
This can occur in several ways, including subdividing a lot into parcels
that do not meet the area requirements 20 or building structures in
violation of a zoning ordinance .21 If the owner later asks for a variance,
claiming an unnecessary hardship based on the money that will be lost if
the owner cannot build on the undersized lot or the burden that will entail
the removal of the structure, the variance will be denied because the
hardship was self-imposed.22 This type of self-imposed hardship.may
arise with or without actual knowledge that the property owner is
violating the zoning law because of constructive notice.23
A second type of self-imposed hardship occurs when land is
purchased with notice of the zoning ordinance and intent to turn a profit
by obtaining a variance. To illustrate, a post-regulation purchaser of an
undersized lot at a tax sale who believed that a single-family dwelling
might be constructed thereon and intended to profit from the variance is
considered to have created his or her own hardship and will not be not

18. See, e.g., In re Gro, 269 A.2d 876, 878 (Pa. 1970); see also PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
53, § 10910.2(a) (West 2002).
19. See Gro, 269 A.2d at 879.
20. See In re Volpe, 121 A.2d 97 (Pa. 1956); see also Randolph Hills, Inc. v.
Montgomery County Council, 285 A.2d 620 (Md. 1972).
21. See RYAN, supra note 7, § 6.2.11.
22. See id.
23. See Stratford Arms, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 239 A.2d 325 (Pa. 1968);
Boyd v. Wilkins Township Bd. of Adjustment, 279 A.2d 363, 364 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1971); see also RYAN, supra note 7, § 6.2.11.
24. See Gro, 269 A.2d 876; In re McClure, 203 A.2d 534 (Pa. 1964) (involving
purchaser who paid excessive price for residentially zoned property with intention of
seeking a variance); see also In re Mont-Bux, Inc., 12 Pa. D. & C.3d 266 (Ct. Com. P1.
Bucks County 1977), aff'd, 397 A.2d 860 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1979) (adopting the opinion
of the court below and holding property purchased at distress price with notice of the
difficulties caused by the zoning was subject to the self-imposed hardship rule).
A purchaser could structure the transaction as contingent on obtaining a variance,
but, if the seller's ownership was post-regulation, any hardship would be self-imposed.

2003]

PRESERVING A CONSTITUTIONAL SAFETY VALVE

entitled to a variance.25 It is this type of self-imposed hardship that
Palazzolo affects.
Despite these bars to traditional variances, Pennsylvania has,
through validity variances, protected against regulatory takings caused
by the application of zoning laws. The validity variance is granted not
because the traditional requirements are met but because the government
may not confiscate the property by denying all reasonable use of the
land.16 Thus, despite application of the self-imposed hardship rule, if the
regulations are confiscatory, a validity variance must be granted. 7
Because the validity variance is a last gasp for constitutionality, the
analysis must be .informed by federal takings jurisprudence. 8 Therefore
the recent United States Supreme Court case of Palazzolo applies.
III.

Palazzolo: The Supreme Court Rejects Rhode Island's Constructive
Notice Rule

Prior to Palazzolo, Rhode Island barred constitutional takings
claims when the owner acquired title to the land subject to the
regulations that allegedly caused the taking. 9 In June of 2001, the
United States Supreme Court rejected the notice rule bar to takings
claims.
A. The Facts
In 1959, Shore Gardens, Inc. ("SGI"), of which Palazzolo was a
shareholder, purchased a waterfront parcel of land in Rhode Island.3 °
Palazzolo then proceeded to buy out his associates to become the sole
25. See Mont-Bux, 12 Pa. D. & C.3d at 275.
26. See, e.g., Pierce v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 189 A.2d 138, 141 (Pa. 1963);
Ferry v. Kownacki, 152 A.2d 456, 458 (Pa. 1959); Jacquelin v. Horsham Township, 312
A.2d 124, 126 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973); see also Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365 (1926); Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928) (limiting the
holding of Euclid to zoning that does not deny an owner any practical use of his or her
land); RYAN, supra note 7, § 6.1.7.
27. See Pierce, 189 A.2d at 141;Ferrv, 152 A.2d at 458.
28. See RYAN, supra note 7, § 3.1.2 (noting that the Federal Constitution has played
no significant role in Pennsylvania zoning law because Pennsylvania sets its own

thresholds for invalidity of the zoning lower than takings jurisprudence). After Palazzolo
the threshold is higher when the self-imposed hardship rule is invoked to deny a variance,
without consideration of the validity variance.
29. See Palazzolo v. State ex rel. Tavares, 746 A.2d 707 (R.I. 2000), rev'd, 533 U.S.
606 (2001). Ironically, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island started the current trend in
the self-imposed hardship rule, that purchase with knowledge of restrictions either does
not prohibit the granting of a variance or is at most a nondeterminative factor to consider
in granting a variance, when in 1957 it rejected the notion that purchase with knowledge
of restrictions constituted self-created hardship. See Roeser Prof'1 Builder, Inc. v. Anne
Arundel County, 793 A.2d 545 (Md. 2002).
30. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 613 (2001).
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shareholder of the corporation. 3' Palazzolo made some early attempts at
development but they were rejected for various reasons. 2 In 1971,
Rhode Island enacted legislation protecting coastal wetlands.33 This
legislation had the effect of greatly limiting the development of nearly all
of the coastal property owned by SGI. 34 In 1978, SGI's corporate charter
was revoked for failure to pay income taxes and title to the property
passed, by operation of state law, to Palazzolo as the corporation's sole
shareholder. 35 He renewed his development efforts in 1983, but his
applications for permits were rejected under the 1971 regulations.36 His
takings claim ensued.37
B.

Rhode IslandBars Palazzolo's Takings Claim

The Superior Court of Rhode Island rejected Palazzolo's takings
claim. The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed because: (1) the claim
was not ripe, (2) Palazzolo had no right to challenge regulations
predating his legal ownership of the property in 1978, and (3) there was
undisputed evidence that $200,000 of development value remained on
the upland parcel of the property. 38 The Rhode Island Supreme Court
also concluded that Palazzolo could not recover under Penn Central39
because he had no reasonable investment-backed expectations that were
affected by the regulation because the regulation predated his
ownership. 40 The Rhode Island Supreme Court regarded the date of legal
acquisition as fatal to either a Lucas v. South CarolinaCoastal CounciP'
or Penn Central takings claim. 42 Palazzolo appealed and the United

31.

See id.

32. See id. at 613-14.
33.

See R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 46-23-1 to -24 (2002).

34. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 614-18.
35. See id. at 614. From an equitable perspective, it is interesting that Palazzolo was
the sole shareholder, and thus personally responsible for paying the corporate taxes.
Transfer of title, and thus Rhode Island's bar to the takings claim, could have been
avoided by his own diligence.
36. Seeid. at 615.
37. Seeid. at615-16.
38. See id.at 616.
39. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (listing three
factors for consideration of whether a land use regulation rises to the level of a taking: (1)
the economic impact on the claimant, (2) the extent to which the regulation interferes
with investment-expectations, and (3) the character or extent of the government action).
40. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 616.
41. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (holding that a regulation that deprives a property owner
of all economically viable use of the property is a taking unless the state can prove that
the regulation does no more to restrict use than what the state courts could do under
background principles of property law or the law of private or public nuisance).
42. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 616.
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States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 4
C. United States Supreme Court Holds Bar to Takings Claim
Unconstitutional
The United States Supreme Court agreed that the Lucas claim was
properly denied because construction was possible on the upland portion
of the property. 44 However, the Court reversed Rhode Island's holding
that the claim was not ripe and that the post-regulation acquisition of title
was fatal to the takings claim.45 The Court remanded the case46 for
consideration of the merits of the takings claim under Penn Central.
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion explicitly rejected a "sweeping
rule... [where] a purchaser or a successive title holder.., is deemed to
have notice of an earlier enacted restriction and is barred from claiming
that it effects a taking., 47 Justice Kennedy reasoned that the Takings
Clause 48 allows a landowner to assert that a particular exercise of the
state's regulatory power is so unreasonable or onerous as to compel
compensation. 49 He noted that Rhode Island's strict constructive notice
rule was unjustified under constitutional law,5° traditional property law, 5'
43.

See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 531 U.S. 923 (2000) (granting certiorari).

44. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 616.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See id. at 626. Justice Kennedy found this holding to be supported by Nollan v.
CaliforniaCoastalCommission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 629.
48. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use
without just compensation.").
49. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 627. Note the similarity to a validity variance. See
supra Part 1I.
50. Justice Kennedy reasoned that such a rule would allow the state to "put an
expiration date on the Takings Clause." See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 627.
5 I. Justice Kennedy reasoned that such a rule would "work a critical alteration to the
nature of property, as the newly regulated landowner is stripped of the ability to transfer
the interest which was possessed prior to the regulation." Id.; see also id. at 627 (quoting
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834 ("[T]he prior owners must be understood to have transferred their
full property rights in the conveying lot.")).
Interestingly, the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of Nollan suggests
that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was wrong in In re Gro, 269 A.2d 876 (Pa. 1970).
The Gro court held thpt the self-imposed hardship rule was not unconstitutional as a
restriction on the free alienability of property because of the party in interest rule. Id. at
880. The party in interest rule gives a potential purchaser standing to challenge the
regulation prior to purchasing the property, thus supposedly preventing an
unconstitutional restriction on the alienability of property. Such a holding has likely been
unconstitutional since Nollan. Full property rights are transferred on conveyance. See
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834 n.2; see also Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 629. It follows that property
rights may not be taken by the state simply because the purchaser failed to exercise party
in interest standing prior to acquisition. Some courts have recognized this fundamental
requirement of property law. See Roeser Prof I Builder, Inc. v. Anne Arundel County,
793 A.2d 545, 551 (Md. 2001).
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and public policy. 52 The full property interest is transferred from one

owner to the next, regardless of the regulatory regime in place at the time
of acquisition,5 3 and regulations do not become background principles of
property law that inhere in the title by mere enactment or transfer of
title.54
D. The Question Left Unansweredby the Majority
Although the Palazzolo majority opinion 55 rejected the use of the
notice rule as a threshold bar to the takings claim under investmentbacked expectations, 56 it did not explain, how such facts were to be
applied to investment-backed expectations.5 7 The concurring Justices
addressed this issue, but differed drastically in their opinions of how to
analyze such facts.
Justice O'Connor wrote separately to address how notice of the
regulations at acquisition should be analyzed under investment-backed
expectations. 58 Justice O'Connor considered notice of the regulations a
factor to be considered in shaping the reasonableness of investmentbacked expectations. 59 According to Justice O'Connor, investmentbacked expectations are only one non-dispositive60 factor to be considered
in analyzing whether a regulation "goes too far.",
Justice O'Connor cautioned against adopting per se rules in
52. Justice Kennedy reasoned that the state may not "secure such a windfall for
itself' by using transfer of title to strip away property rights. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 627.
"The proposed rule is, furthermore, capricious in effect. The young owner, contrasted
with the older owner, the owner with resources to hold contrasted with the owner with the
need to sell, would be in different positions." Id. at 628.
53. See supra note 51.
54. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 630.
55. Section II-A of the opinion was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Thomas. See id. at 610. Justice O'Connor wrote separately to explain how the postregulation acquisition should be considered on remand. See id. at 632 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). Justice Scalia wrote separately to express his disagreement with Justice
O'Connor's recommended approach for remand. See id. at 636 (Scalia, J., concurring).
56. See id. at 626. Justice Kennedy rejected the theory that post-enactment
purchasers cannot challenge a regulation under the Takings Clause because the states can
shape and define property rights and investment backed expectations through prospective
legislation. "The State may not put so potent a Hobbesian stick into the Lockean
bundle." Id.
57. See generally id. Although the case was litigated as a Lucas categorical taking,
the Court determined that the merits of the taking claim should be addressed on remand
under Penn Central. See id. at 623-24.
58. See id. at 634 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
59. See id.(O'Connor, J., concurring).
60. id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415
(1922)). The other two factors are: (1) the economic impact on the claimant, and (2) the
character and the extent of the regulations. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City,
438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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6
weighing the relevant circumstances surrounding a takings claim. 1
Justice O'Connor wanted to use Palazzolo as a way of restoring balance
to the Penn Central inquiry.62 She also noted that there must be a
balance between preventing the state from imposing a Hobbesian system
of property rights,63 and achieving fairness in takings jurisprudence by
64
preventing windfalls to certain property owners.
Justice Scalia wrote separately to express his disagreement with
Justice O'Connor about how the regulatory regime at the time of
acquisition should be considered in shaping investment-backed
expectations. 65 Justice Scalia viewed the fact that a restriction existed at
the time the purchaser took title as having no bearing upon the
determination of whether a restriction is so substantial as to constitute a
taking. 66 "The 'investment-backed expectations' that the law will take
into account do not include the assumed validity of a restriction that in
fact deprives property of so much of its value as to be
unconstitutional. 6 7 In Justice Scalia's opinion, potential windfalls to the
purchaser who bought with notice of the regulations do not pose a
problem. 68 In his view, the windfalls, if any, should go to the property
owner rather than the government.69
Palazzolo stands for the notion that threshold bars to takings claims
based on constructive notice will not be tolerated under the Fifth
Amendment, 70 and regulations do not become part of the title to the
property merely by the passage of title. 71 However, it is not clear how
notice of regulations at acquisition shapes the investment-backed

61. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 635-36 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
62. See id (O'Connor, J., concurring).
63. See supra notes 51, 56.
64. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 635 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
If investment-backed expectations are given exclusive significance in the Penn
Central analysis and existing regulations dictate the reasonableness of those
expectations in every instance, then the State wields too much power to
redefine property rights upon passage of title. On the other hand if existing
regulations do nothing to inform the analysis, then some property owners may
reap windfalls and an important indicium of fairness is lost.
Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). Note the similarity to Justice Kennedy's characterization
of Palazzolo as preserving Lockean notions of property rights. See id. at 626.
65. See id. at 636 (Scalia, J., concurring).
66. See id. at 637 (Scalia, J., concurring).
67. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
68. See id at 636 (Scalia, J. concurring) ("This can, I suppose, be called a
windfall-though it is not much different from the windfalls that occur every day at stock
exchanges or antique auctions, where the knowledgeable (or the venturesome) profit at
the expense of the ignorant (or the risk averse).").
69. See id. at 637 (Scalia, J., concurring).
70. See id. at 626-27.
71. See id at 627-30. So long as the regilations are not background principles of
property law.
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expectations of the property owner for purposes of a Penn Central
takings claim.
Nonetheless, because notice of the regulations at
acquisition may not bar the takings claim, a constitutional safety-valve
must not be sealed by the same expedient.
IV.

Analysis of Pennsylvania's Self-Imposed Hardship Rule After
Palazzolo

The United States Supreme Court's rejection of the notice rule as a
bar to regulatory takings requires an end to the application of the selfimposed hardship rule in Pennsylvania to deny variances. If the takings
claim may not be barred by notice of the regulations, the constitutional
safety valve must be allowed to operate regardless of whether the
property owner acted with notice of the regulations. The determination
of whether a variance is necessary must focus on the effect of the
regulations on the property and the property owner, rather than the on the
regulatory regime in place at the time of acquisition of the property.
Although the self-imposed hardship rule may still bar a traditional
variance, the ultimate question of whether a variance is necessary cannot
be determined by the rule.
A.

The RelationshipBetween Regulatory Takings and Variances

The Takings Clause is intended to "prevent the government from
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness
and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.
Property
owners start out with the unrestricted right to use their land as they see
fit. Zoning regulations create a public good by imposing limitations on
the use of private property. 73 This regulation can rise to the level of a
taking 74 if it is not reasonably necessary for a substantial public
purpose,75 or if it has an unduly harsh impact upon the owner's use of the
property.76 Even regulations that serve a substantial public purpose, such
as zoning, 77 may amount to a taking as they are applied to private

72.
73.

Id.at 618 (citing Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). See generally
JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 1, §§ 3.13-.20.

74. See, e.g., Agins v. Tiburon, 477 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (noting that zoning may
effect a taking under Penn Central TransportationCo. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,
138 n.36 (1978)); Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928) (holding that
the zoning power, while broad, is not unlimited in that the zoning must substantially
advance legitimate state interests).
75. Zoning meets the public purpose prong of this test. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at
627.
76. See id.
at 634 (citing Yee v. Escondito, 503 U.S. 519, 523 (1992)).
77. See id.
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property.7 8
Zoning plans permit variances to prevent unconstitutional takings
when, owing to special conditions, a literal enforcement of the ordinance
would result in an unnecessary hardship or when the regulation would be
confiscatory without a variance. 79 The traditional standard generally
prevents regulatory takings when the regulation would have an unduly
harsh impact on the private property. However, the Supreme Court's
recent holding requires a change to the way Pennsylvania applies its
zoning law if the variance is to have the ability to act as a constitutional
safety valve.
The fact that a property owner had notice of the regulation when the
owner violated the zoning ordinance, or sought to obtain a variance after
a speculative or distress purchase, prevents a traditional variance under
the self-imposed hardship rule. 80 Even if the self-imposed hardship rule
would bar a traditional variance under these factors, these factors do not
bar a takings claim. 8 ' Thus, in order for a variance to serve its purpose as
a constitutional safety valve, the validity variance must be granted if the
regulations amount to a taking as applied. 82 This analysis must be
informed by United States Supreme3Court takings jurisprudence if it is to
prevent an unconstitutional taking.
78. See Ferry v. Kownacki, 152 A.2d 456, 458 (Pa. 1959); Jacquelin v. Horsham
Township, 312 A.2d 124, 126 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973); see also In re Key Realty Co.,
182 A.2d 187, 190-99 (Pa. 1962) (Bell, C.J., concurring).
79. See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 1, § 5.14; RYAN, supra note 7,
§ 6.1.6. The existence of such a safety valve was a consideration in upholding the
constitutionality of zoning. See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 383
(1926).
80. See, e.g., Boyd v. Wilkins Township Bd. of Adjustment, 279 A.2d 363 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1971) (denying variance to property owners who unknowingly constructed
porch in violation of side-yard requirements); In re Mont-Bux, Inc., 12 Pa. D. & C.3d
266 (Ct. Com. P1. Bucks County 1977), aff'd, 397 A.2d 860 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1979)
(adopting the opinion of the court below denying variance after speculative purchase);
see also RYAN, supra note 7, § 6.2.11. But see, e.g., Myron v. City of Plymouth, 562
N.W.2d 21 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (rejecting notice rule as a bar to a variance, but
denying taking claim in the basis of the notice rule).
81. Notice of the regulations does not bar the takings claim. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S.
at 626-30. It seems safe to assume that building on one's own property or making a
capitalistic purchase would in no way bar a takings claim.
82. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 127 (1985).
A requirement that a person obtain a permit before engaging in a certain use of
his or her property does not itself 'take' the property in any sense: after all, the
very existence of a permit system implies that permission may be granted,
leaving the landowner free to use the property as desired ....Only when a
permit is denied and the effect of the denial is to prevent 'economically viable'
use of the land in question can it be said that a taking has occurred.
Id.
83. Pennsylvania has recognized the application of the United States Supreme
Court's takings jurisprudence in determining the validity of municipal land use

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 107:4

A Lucas categorical taking occurs when a regulation deprives a
property owner of all economically viable use of the property, and the
regulations are more onerous than background principles of property
law. 84 This analysis is not new to Pennsylvania zoning law. Validity
variances are granted to prevent the destruction of all real value of the
property. 85 This occurs when the property as zoned has no value or only
distressed value. 86
Presumably, Pennsylvania's threshold for this
variance involves a higher denominator than would be required for a
87
Lucas taking and therefore would prevent Lucas takings.
The real departure from current Pennsylvania zoning law occurs in
the Penn Central taking. The Penn Central analysis looks primarily, but
not exclusively, to three factors: the economic impact on the claimant,
the extent to which the regulation interferes with investment-backed
88
expectations, and the character or extent of the government action.
The ad hoc equitable analysis applies even with notice of the
regulations.8 9 However, whether notice of those regulations factor into
the analysis of investment-backed expectations was left unanswered by
the Court.
B.

How Should Pre-ExistingRegulations Be Analyzed in Determining
Whether a Variance Is Necessary To Prevent a Regulatory Taking?

The Palazzolo majority did not address how the existence of the
regulations at the time of acquisition should be analyzed in determining
whether the property owner had reasonable investment-backed
expectations. However, the concurring opinions of Justices O'Connor
and Scalia may be instructive as to how lower courts might view postordinances. See United Artists' Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 635 A.2d
612, 614 (Pa. 1993).
84. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). It is safe to assume
that zoning is not a background principle of property law in Pennsylvania, as the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has recognized that zoning can rise to the level of a
Lucas taking. See Ferry v. Kownacki, 152 A.2d 456, 458 (Pa. 1959).
85. See Ferry, 152 A.2d at 458.
86. See id.
87. The right of a landowner to obtain a validity variance to prevent compensation
"swallowed" the concept articulated in Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928), that
zoning is circumscribed by constitutional limitations. RYAN, supra note 7, § 3.62.
88. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
89. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001). For purposes of this
comment it must be assumed that Palazzolo was not a holding limited only to
constructive notice through transfer of title by operation of law. See id. at 614. This fact
alone could undermine nearly any application of the case if courts choose to construe the
holding so narrowly.
However, given Justice O'Connor's concern with preventing
windfalls by doing away with the notice rule, see id. at 632-36 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring), and the lack of limiting language in Justice Kennedy's opinion, such a
narrow holding was probably not intended by the Court.
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regulation acquisition under investment-backed expectations, and thus
how those expectations may be viewed in assessing the merits of a
variance request. Although the character of a zoning ordinance probably
favors the government because it likely provides reciprocal benefits to91
the property owner, 90 the economic impact on the claimant may not.
Furthermore, any speculative purchase of real estate likely carries with it
some investment-backed expectation,, as would any improvement to a
is whether those investmentproperty owner's house. The question
92
reasonable.
are
expectations
backed
Justice O'Connor's approach would allow tribunals 93 to use the
post-regulation acquisition to shape the reasonableness of investmentbacked expectations.9 4 This approach is in line with Penn Central's ad
hoc equitable inquiry. 95 If a party seeks a variance that may prevent a
regulatory taking, the variance cannot be barred simply by application of
the notice rule.96 However, under this approach, notice of the regulations
could be a significant factor in the ad hoc equitable inquiry.9 7 Thus, the
equity of the circumstances may prevent the validity variance under
Justice O'Connor's approach.
Through this equitable analysis, a knowing violator of zoning
regulations will likely fail the Penn Central test for a taking, and, if so,
will not be entitled to a validity variance. However, the situation may be
different for a property owner who was merely on constructive notice of

90. See id. at 627. But see In re Key Realty Co., 182 A.2d 187, 190 (Pa. 1962) (Bell,
C.J., concurring) (stating that the challenged regulation is not providing a reciprocal
benefit in that the claimant suffers the social costs of the apartment housing, but does not
receive the private benefits of such zoning); Best v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 141 A.2d
606, 614 (Pa. 1957) (Bell, C.J., dissenting in part).
91. For example, while side-yard requirements provide a public benefit that is
usually reciprocal to the owner, the economic impact on the claimant for having to
remove a structure inadvertently constructed in side-yard open space under the selfimposed hardship rule may be very significant. See Boyd v. Wilkins Township Bd. of
Adjustment, 279 A.2d 363 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1971).
92. Although Justice O'Connor sought to "restore balance" to the Penn Central
inquiry, she recognized that investment-backed expectations historically have garnered
strong consideration in the Penn Central analysis. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 635-36
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
93. The author uses "tribunals" to refer to both zoning boards and the courts, as
adjudicatory bodies. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1512 (7th ed. 1999).
94. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 635-36 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
95. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
96. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. 606.
97. Id. at 635-36 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Courts properly consider the effect of
existing regulations under the rubric of investment-backed expectations in determining
whether a compensable taking has occurred."); see also Twigg v. Town of Kennebunk,
662 A.2d 914 (Me. 1995) ("[A] purchase with knowledge does not preclude the granting
of a variance and, at most, is considered a nondeterminative factor in consideration of a
variance.").
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the zoning, violated the ordinance by mistake, and would otherwise
suffer substantial financial detriment if he or she was forced to remove
the nonconforming structure. 98
The application of Palazzolo to the speculative purchaser, who
would not get a variance under the self-imposed hardship rule, strikes at
the core of the disagreement between Justices O'Connor and Scalia.
Under Justice O'Connor's approach, the speculator would receive a
validity variance only if equity so required. The tribunal could consider
the fact that there was notice of the regulations, and the speculator was
simply seeking to profit from a variance. However, Justice Scalia's
approach would likely yield a different result.
Justice Scalia's approach does not recognize the regulations that
were in place at the time of acquisition.99 This is a slight departure from
the ad hoc inquiry of Penn Central. However, it avoids the problem of
forcing the purchaser to account for potentially unconstitutional
regulations when purchasing the property. By not taking the regulations
into account, as Justice Scalia suggests, the tribunal will not have to
consider whether the purchaser was speculating on obtaining a variance
or whether speculation on real estate and the potential unconstitutionality
of the zoning regulations is somehow inequitable. 00 This approach also
avoids analyzing the adequacy of consideration.' 0 ' Justice Scalia's
approach would eliminate the use of the self-imposed hardship rule to
deny variances because the pre-existing regulations would have no effect
on the reasonableness of the property owner's investment-backed
expectations.
Justice Scalia's analysis would not prevent even knowing or
mistaken zoning violators from receiving a variance if the regulations
were unduly burdensome. The sole question under Justice Scalia's
approach is whether the application of the zoning ordinance to the
particular property rises to the level of a Penn Centraltaking.
This approach might yield windfalls to the speculative purchasers,
98. See Boyd v. Wilkins Twp. Bd. of Adjustment, 279 A.2d 363 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1971) (denying variance and requiring that the owner remove a porch mistakenly built

into the side-yard open space).
99. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 637 (Scalia, J., concurring).
100. Given the language in his concurrence in Palazzolo, Justice Scalia would likely
disagree with the Pennsylvania approach, which seems to chastise capitalistic speculation
on real estate: "The 'investment-backed expectations' that the law will take into account
do not include the assumed validity of a restriction that in fact deprives property of so
much of its value as to be unconstitutional." Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). Compare id
(Scalia, J., concurring) with In re Gro, 269 A.2d 876 (Pa. 1970), and Harper v. Zoning
Hearing Bd., 434 A.2d 381 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975).
101. See, e.g., JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
§ 4.4 (4th ed. 1998) ("As a general rule the courts do not review the adequacy of
consideration. The parties make their own bargains.").
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in that they could purchase property at distress prices and then seek a
02
variance based on Penn Central.1
Although some courts may be
troubled with what seems like an inequity, they need not be. As Justice
Scalia noted, it is far better to have these windfalls go to a savvy investor
03

than a government entity that enacts unconstitutional regulations.1
It is important to understand that under either concurring Justice's
approach, the municipality has the option of granting a variance or
compensating the property owner for a taking. This promotes economic
efficiency. If the variance is not worth the effect on the public, then the
public must compensate the private property owner for the public good.
This would not "in effect put an end to all zoning," as feared by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 104 The municipality will choose the
compensation option over granting the variance only when the public
benefit of the regulation exceeds the private costs of the taking to the
property owner. Fairness to the private property owner will be achieved
by compensating him or her for the government-mandated gift to the
public and incentives will be created for the enforcement of only
constitutional and economically efficient zoning ordinances.
This
efficiency benefit applies whether or not the purchaser was speculating
on attaining a variance.
C. Palazzolo's Effect
Despite the lack of clarity as to how post-regulation acquisition may
be considered in shaping investment-backed expectations, and thus how
the grant or denial of a validity variance must be analyzed after
Palazzolo, it is clear that the self-imposed hardship rule is no longer the
final determination of whether a variance is necessary. A regulatory
taking may occur despite the factors that would bar the traditional
variance under the self-imposed hardship rule. In order to preserve the
constitutionality of Pennsylvania's zoning regulations, a validity variance
must be considered, using constitutional takings jurisprudence, when the
self-imposed hardship rule is applied to deny a traditional variance.
V.

Conclusion
When the government restricts the use and enjoyment of private

property through zoning, the value of the restricted private property is

102. See In re Mont-Bux, Inc., 12 Pa. D. & C.3d 266 (Ct. Com. P1. Bucks County
1977), aff'd, 397 A.2d 860 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1979) (adopting the opinion of the court

below).
103. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 636-37 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Roeser Prof'l
Builder, Inc. v. Anne Arundel County, 793 A.2d 545, 547, 552 (Md. 2002).

104.

Best v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 141 A.2d 606, 612 (Pa. 1957).
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affected. The United States Supreme Court's rejection of the notice rule
and the notion that regulations inhere in the transfer of title demand a
change in the application of Pennsylvania zoning law. When the selfimposed hardship rule is invoked to prevent a traditional variance, a
regulatory taking may still occur because the factors that prevent the
traditional variance under the self-imposed hardship rule do not prevent a
taking after Palazzolo. Thus, when the self-imposed hardship rule is
used to deny a variance, the zoning hearing board. or court must also
consider whether a validity variance or compensation is necessary to
preserve the constitutionality of the zoning ordinance. Only in this way
can the constitutionality of the zoning be preserved when the selfimposed hardship rule is applied.

